We’ve been getting quite a few calls from new investors lately who are interested in investing in trust deed secured loans. This makes a certain amount of sense to me, as a number of factors are lining up to enhance the attractiveness of this type of investing. The factors I have in mind include the following:

• The stock market is highly volatile.
• Treasury securities pay almost nothing and are only rated AA+ (by–as you know–one particular rating agency).
• Most investors wish to diversify beyond commodities markets such as gold and other hard metals.
• Trust deed secured loans are backed by actual collateral to facilitate recovery in the event of a default. Very few investments, if you think of it, actually have a backstop.
• There seems to be a growing sense among economists, various experts, and those who deal in real estate markets that real estate values are not likely to fall significantly during the next few years (though they may continue to decline in certain areas).
• As I noted in an earlier post, Miami markets are fast on the mend. What is happening there? (investors from all over the world have decided that property values are at a low and are swooping in to buy excess inventory, thus driving prices up. This may be the beginning of a potentially nationwide trend. Investors tend to be bearish by nature, so when they think a market has pretty much bottomed out, it is worth paying attention to this collective information.
• The point about the market more-or-less bottoming out seems to apply most particularly to commercial real estate.
• And of course, as an investor you have a buffer against a reasonable amount of depreciation in your collateral market. For example, if you lend on a certain property for one year at 65% LTV and if values in that market fall by 8% during that year, you’re most likely going to come out whole if you have to take back the property. (The markets for rentals appear to be strong.)

Let me know if you have any additional thoughts regarding pros and/or cons of investing in trust deed secured loans at this time.

On a related  note: this is a very specialized niche blog. Currently there are 123 subscribers, and I don’t have any way of knowing how many people read the blog through and RSS feed. (This compared with my private money for borrower/brokers post which has 1750 subscribers and an unknown number of RSS readers). I rarely every receive comments back from the readers of this blog–and don’t get me wrong; I understand this as I don’t often comment on the blogs that I myself read (I tend to silently enjoy them). Yet I sometimes lose steam as I begin to wonder if folks out there are actually reading this stuff.

I am going to do something now that I ordinarily only do with my wife: beg. If you are reading these posts (or at least a few posts here and there when you have the time), would you be so kind as to send a quick note back or post a message saying so (nothing fancy; just an “I read this blog” sort of thing)? I would appreciate it greatly, so please, please, oh please … <begging part>. There, that wasn’t so bad now was it.

The other thing that would be quite helpful is if readers would give me some indication of what they would like to see in future posts. With some 17 years in the business, I am capable of writing a decent post with regard to just about any aspect of the private money investing business, but I get to a point where I simply don’t know where to go next. This is your chance. Put in a request, and I’ll do my best to give you something worthwhile back. Deal?

– Clay (clay@privatemoneysource.com, 503-476-2909 or 800-971-1858)

Clay is Vice President of Fairfield Financial, a primary source for private money loans since 1964.  Fairfield works with a broad range of private money investors, in a broker capacity, finding, underwriting, presenting, closing, servicing, and when necessary, assisting in the workout of difficult loans.

As you all know, sometimes we have to be creative to get loans done in this market. One of the most critical aspects of any loan (as you well know) is the Loan to Value ratio, and there are often options for reducing the LTV to make the deal more attractive.

For purchases, the seller carry back is a great strategy. We all know that it’s a buyer’s market, so a motivated seller is going to have to really entice those buyers. In some instances, the seller will simply accept that the market demands a lower price. However, under the right circumstances, the seller could be willing to carry back some portion of the purchase price as a note in 2nd position. This clearly opens up a lot more opportunities for making a loan investment work.

Sometimes if a deal is close, but just a little high on the LTV, we will look at carrying back our fee or a portion of our fee (and any broker fees as well).  With riskier development loans, it can make a big difference to the lender if that LTV is a few points lower. By carrying fees in this manner, it gives the lender additional security if the deal goes bad. Certainly, if the broker is (or brokers are) confident in the project, and has the ability to hold off on those fees, it can sometimes make the difference between a go and a no-go.

Another option is to cross collateralize an additional property. If the borrower is able, putting up an additional property can potentially lower the LTV. At the very least, it will add security to the loan, and show the lender an increased level of commitment by putting more skin in the game.

These options don’t all work all the time and sometimes none of them work, but they do provide some nice tools for converting a marginal investment into a desirable one.

– Clay (sparkman@lendicom.com, 503-476-2909 or 800-971-1858)

Clay is Vice President of Fairfield Financial, a primary source for private money loans since 1964.  Fairfield works with a broad range of private money investors, in a broker capacity, finding, underwriting, presenting, closing, servicing, and when necessary, assisting in the workout of difficult loans.

We’ve been through nearly 3 ½ rough years in the real estate market—and projections seem to indicate that we will finally see clear up-turn in the second half of this year, but no one really knows for sure.  We have managed to survive this down-time (thus far) and continue doing loans even in the face of uncertainty to borrowers and investors.  Certainly our loan volume is down.  Less people are borrowing for projects at the moment (though we are starting to see some upturn there) and our investors are being more conservative given the level of uncertainty.  The key areas we look, I would say, even more carefully than we did before the crash are:  (1) LTV: we used to do a lot of stuff at 75%.  Now most of what we place is at 65% or less.  (2) Professionalism of the borrower: we want to see that the borrower is proceeding with caution, has done his/her homework, has backup strategies in place, and has a reasonable track record.  (3) Exit strategy: it is hard to be certain in this climate that an exit strategy will work, but we beat this to death to be as sure as we can that there is/are one or more ways to exit the loan.

Rigorously following these guidelines has served us well and has generally worked out well for our investors.  By way of example, here are four loans that we have closed (or are in the process of closing) recently.

Mini-condos for simple living on the Washington coast

1.     Loan Amount: $286,000

2.     Term: 1 year

3.     Interest Rate: 13%

4.     Monthly Payments: $1,895.83 Interest Only

5.     Construction Holdback Account: $265,000

6.     Security:  Deed of Trust in 1^st Position security interest in real property at xxxxxxxxxx

7.     Projected Value by Borrower Comps: $476,000

8.     As-is Value by Borrower Estimate $30,000

9.     As-Is Front End LTV Borrower Estimate:  70%

10.     Completion LTV by Borrower Comps:  62%

This loan is to provide funds to build four detached condos on the Washington Coast.  The borrowers, xxxxxxxxxx of xxxxx company requested a loan of $286,000 to provide funds for the construction and various loan costs and closing fees.  $265,000 of this was deposited into a construction holdback account.  The borrowers have $21,000 invested into the purchase and clearing of the lot so far, which is effectively being considered as their down payment or skin in the game.

This will be the 3^rd group of condos that the borrowers have built.  The first set of condos was built in the fall of 2009, and the borrowers report that they sold in approximately 2 months.  The 2^nd set was completed in the fall of 2010 (this is an existing construction loan with Fairfield), and at least one of those units has been sold for the full asking price.  The borrower reports that there has been a lot of activity and interest in the remaining units.

Partner xxxxx  is a realtor, and her husband is the contractor who will do the actual construction.  The borrower plans to exit this loan through the sale of these condos, and has requested that each condo be released with a principal reduction of $75,000.

The property is located on a cul-de-sac approximately 1,800 feet from the average high tide line, and two blocks from public beach access. These condos will be 480Sq/Ft with a full kitchen and bath, and made with eco-friendly materials.

Adult care facility in Washington

1.     Loan Amount: $270,000

2.     Term: 24 Months

3.     6 months minimum interest

4.     Interest Rate: 14%

5.     Monthly Payments: $3,150.00 Interest Only

6.     Security:  Deed of Trust in 1st Position security interest in real property at xxxxxxxxxx

7.     Value of Collateral by Appraisal:  $750,000

8.     LTV based on Appraisal:  36%

The borrower, xxxxx, inherited an adult care facility approximately 2 years ago.  She requested this loan to funds to pay the probate and costs incurred in the transferring of the estate.

The subject property is a 4402 SF 8 bedroom 3-bath home being used as an adult care facility.  There are several outbuildings being used as rentals to the borrower’s family.  Leases were provided.  The home sits on 5 acres, adjacent to a bare 5 acre parcel that is also being used as additional collateral.

Vacation rental in central Oregon

1.     Loan Amount: $120,000

2.     Term: 36 Months

3.     6 months minimum interest

4.     Interest Rate: 13%

5.     Monthly Payments: $1,300.00 Interest Only

6.     Security:  Deed of Trust in 1st Position security interest in real property at xxxxxxxxxx

7.     Value of Collateral by Borrower Comps:  $227,900

8.     LTV based on Collateral by Purchase Price:  53%

The borrower, xxxxx company had negotiated the purchase of this property for $150,000.  The seller was in financial distress and needed to sell quickly.  The borrower believed that this price was well under value (the list price was reduced to $199,500 on 12/8/10), and were requesting 10K for cosmetic improvements.  They put down 25k, and the seller is carried back another 25K to make the loan work.  The loan was personally guaranteed.

The subject property is a 1,618SF home that will be used as a vacation rental.  It is located in the xxxxx subdivision which has amenities such as a club house, swimming pool, excessive common grounds use, and paved bike paths.  The property has 3 bedrooms, 2 baths, fireplace, and wrap around deck.

Self-storage facility in northern Washington

1.     Loan Amount: $375,000

2.     Term: 36 Months

3.     6 months minimum interest

4.     Interest Rate: 12%

5.     Monthly Payments: $3,750.00 Interest Only

6.     Security:  Deed of Trust in 1st Position security interest in real property at xxxxxxxxxx

7.     Value of Collateral by Purchase Price:  $565,000

8.     LTV based on Collateral by Purchase Price:  66%

The borrower, xxxxx, is an experienced owner and operator of self-storage facilities.  He had the subject property under contract for $565,000, and was seeking a loan of $375,000.  There was approximately $20,000 in credits that the seller agreed to provide, and the borrower stepped up with a down payment of approximately $200,000.

The borrower plans to live on site and manage the property which will greatly reduce his personal living expenses as well as eliminate the wages that are currently being paid to an on-site manager.  In addition, he plans to install a self-service Kiosk that would allow easier access for new tenants to sign up 24/7.  He also plans to improve the signage, making the property more visible.  Finally, he will offer a $1 first month move in special and change the name of the property from xxxxxxxxxx to yyyyyyyyyy.  He believes that this name change will improve the search engine rankings and ultimately increase occupancy.  Through these changes the borrower believes that he can increase his occupancy from the current 50% to 80% in the first year.

The borrower plans to exit this loan by refinancing with and SBA loan.  More info regarding the feasibility of this exit strategy is described below.

The subject property is consists of 2 lots with a combined 2 acres and 22,923SF of rentable space over 7 buildings.  In addition, there is a small 2br 1ba manufacture home on the property.  The property was reported to be in excellent condition, and located in a prime spot in northern Washington.  There are several self-storage facilities in this area, which are reported to have low vacancy rates.

The current occupancy rate is at 50%, which the borrower attributes to the current “absentee owner”.  As far as he can tell, there isn’t much for marketing activity and no incentive for the on-site manager to increase their workload by working to increase the occupancy.

– Clay (sparkman@lendicom.com, 503-476-2909 or 800-971-1858)

Clay is Vice President of Fairfield Financial, a primary source for private money loans since 1964.  Fairfield works with a broad range of private money investors, in a broker capacity, finding, underwriting, presenting, closing, servicing, and when necessary, assisting in the workout of difficult loans.

The national economy is in a state of confusion and the local economy is in a state of confusion. So what does this mean for the market for investing in trust deed based loans?

Well of course nobody really knows–and this is just my take on it–but here goes:  First of all, let’s talk briefly about investment choices.  With so much uncertainty in alternative investment vehicles, maybe trust deed secured loans are a pretty good place to put your money.  After all, you will have real security backing up your value, and that can’t be said about most investments.  And you certainly have the opportunity to receive a nice double digit return on your investment, and that being so even if you opt for the best and most potentially safe such investments.

The key thing to keep in mind is that real estate markets are uncertain and potentially volatile.  And thus you need to be particularly rigorous in making loan selections.  I would say that the most important keys are: (1) Make sure you know as much as possible about the recent price history of the particular market you are considering.  This will most likely allow you to better gage the potential future volatility of the market.  (2) Keep the loans either short or long.  1-2 years for quick-turn projects, and maybe 5 years to those borrowers looking for and able to afford the long hold.  The danger zone in my opinion tends to be in between.  (3) Make sure that your borrower has a solid exit strategy (no exit strategy is foolproof given the seemingly scare nature of bank financing, but some strategies look a whole lot better than others).  And (4) Keep your LTV a little lower than usual so as to better absorb potential market depreciation during the life of your loan.  We still have clients who lend 75% LTV on very solid transactions, but these days most investors feel better at or around 65%.

With regard to demand, the following is relevant once again: Markets are uncertain and potentially volatile.  How does this apply to the market for borrowers of private money? To answer this question, we have to look at who borrows private money. I would say with complete confidence that easily 80% of all of the loans that we do (Fairfield Financial) are to those who buy, sell, renovate, and construct real property with the intention of earning a profit.

The relevant point here is that most real estate investors are likely to be avoiding the long-term hold and attempting to make the good buy and turn properties for a quick profit. This is a market where properties are going back to the banks at a frightening rate, and where this spells bad news for home owners who over-borrowed, this means opportunity for the quick-strike investor. The bottom line of all this is what? Again, it’s hard to say, but I think it would be fair to conclude that if you are a private money investor (like most of you on this list), you might want to look particularly for: (1) those borrowers looking to buy and sell property on a dime to make a profit (many times you can justify lending up to 100% of fix up money and repair money to these borrowers when they are buying well), or (2) borrowers that have a longer hold scenario (closer to 5 years) that fall between the cracks of the more conventional lenders, generally already own the property,  and might bear a 10-12% holding rate to bridge the gap for several years. The idea is that this type of borrower can afford private money sized payments over the longer haul and will utilize this option to get to from point A to point B.  And point B–I might add–is a place that we’d all like to believe is a better place, a place where life is predictable once again and property values are something we can hang our hat on.

– Clay (clay@privatemoneysource.com, 503-476-2909 or 800-971-1858)

Clay is Vice President of Fairfield Financial, a primary source for private money loans since 1964.  Fairfield works with a broad range of private money investors, in a broker capacity, finding, underwriting, presenting, closing, servicing, and when necessary, assisting in the workout of difficult loans.

I just recently finished reading The Greatest Trade Ever, the 2009 book by Wall Street Journal reporter Gregory Zuckerman.  It is a terrific read.  I really enjoyed it.  It evolves primarily around John Paulson, and tells the story of how he managed to make billions of dollars for himself and his hedge fund investors by arranging a series of investment positions that bet against the rapidly expanding subprime positions in the market.  In particular it tells the story of how he worked with banks such as Goldman and Bear Sterns to construct and facilitate such trades.

Zuckerman doesn’t waste much time judging the ethical or legal aspect of such trades.  Rather, he tells a damned good story of how a few individuals predicted an event that others just couldn’t fathom, and then positioned themselves, against all prevailing notions, to ultimately reap enormous profits from their heart-felt predictions.

It is a story of the most profitable series of trades on Wall Street, and if one theme comes through loud and clear, it is that only an outsider (and somewhat of a misfit) such as Paulson (and a handful of others) could have managed to “think” so counter to the prevailing notions of the industry, and perhaps more importantly, would have dared to defy so many others in the industry to the point of personally and professionally marginalizing themselves in the process.

Paulson is not under indictment, but as we know, Goldman is being sued by the SEC in a high profile case specifically targeting the Paulson-backed synthetic CDOs.  I personally would have to say that I lean toward Warren Buffet’s position that overall Goldman is not really to blame here.  See the New York Times story, From Buffett, Thought-Out Support for Goldman, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/from-buffett-thought-out-support-for-goldman/

According to Buffet, “I don’t care if John Paulson is shorting these bonds. I’m going to have no worries that he has superior knowledge,” he said, adding: “It’s our job to assess the credit.” The assets are the assets. The math either works or it doesn’t.”

His point being that it wasn’t important for Goldman to disclose to fat-cat institutional buyers that John Paulson was shorting the synthetic CDOs they were buying.  The buyers were professional investors, and should have looked deep inside the assets to see exactly what they were buying.  Paulson certainly did.

I am now nearly finished reading The Big Short by Michael Lewis, and I must say this book—like every Lewis book I have read–is fascinating and irresistible.  It deals with the same basic material as Zuckerman’s book but tells the story from various other points of view.  It is quite a bit more technical than Zuckerman’s book, and in this sense, is precisely what I was looking for.  Lewis has a talent for explaining complex things in simple ways, and this book goes a long way toward answering unanswered questions I had regarding “How did this all work?”

What I get out of Lewis that I didn’t get out of Zuckerman so much, is that it is the ratings agencies that are at ground-zero of the breakdown of the system.  It is hard to tell if they were really stupid or really crooked or both, but certainly there had to be a good dose of both at work here.  I don’t care how you package and re-package subprime loans into bonds.  It should have been clear that such bonds could never be packaged in such a way as to earn a triple-A rating (same as US Government debt), and yet this was happening (and so much more).  Yes, the sellers of bonds and CDOs were gaming the system, but nonetheless, the ratings agencies allowed themselves to be quite easily gamed.  You might say they were easy.

The real lesson of all this is that the sub-prime collapse could have been quite readily predicted—as it was so clearly by a small number of individuals—but that there was just too much money being made and perhaps more importantly, a deeply institutionalized thought process at work here that defied those involved to even consider notions counter to the norm.

And what is the lesson for the individual trust deed investor?  It is this I think: Don’t invest in trust deed style securities unless you know what you are doing.  You must be able to evaluate the quality of any given loan.  And most of all, never–I mean never ever–let anyone else tell you what is and is not an acceptable level of risk.  Ultimately that decision is yours and only yours to make.

– Clay (clay@privatemoneysource.com)

Colloquialisms are funny things.  We use them pretty much every day in our speech and in our writing and yet most of us, I suspect, though we know the meanings of the expressions, frequently don’t know why the individual words have come to mean what they mean.  Take for example: “Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth.”  I must have been in my forties before I looked up one day, scratching my head, and mumbled to myself, “What the heck does that really mean?”  I remember asking my Dad, and having grown up on a farm he was able to explain to me without hesitation that it was a little like what tire kicking is to automobiles.  So there you go.  It all makes sense–if you know something about farms and horses, that is.  And while we’re on that topic, does anybody really do that: kick tires I mean?  I have purchased maybe ten cars in my life, and I’m pretty sure I never actually kicked the tires on any of them out on the showroom floor.  And still, it is a great image.  I wish I were that kind of guy who could pull it off.

So with regard to investing, the egg analogies are kind of funny.  First of all, there is “the nest egg,” which seems to refer to ones entire savings or investments.  It is singular however you will note.  You don’t have nest eggs.  You have a nest egg.  But given the fate of Humpty Dumpty and the fragility of eggs as such, we almost can’t bear the thought of our entire fortune being so fragile.  (And yet, if we don’t invest intelligently, maybe it is.)

And so of course to that end, we attempt to diversify our investments—and pretty much everyone is familiar with the expression, “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” which immediately makes sense as an analogy—that is until you stop to think about it.  Follow me here: if each egg represents a single investment, then perhaps each egg basket in the analogy represents an investment type or sector, and if you think about it, you still don’t have a secure investment strategy here.  Say you have ten baskets, each with a handful of eggs in them.  Are you going to keep those baskets stored all in one place, and how are you going to transport them?  Surely you must never put them all in the same egg truck!  I would like to propose thus a revised version of the expression.  Can we all get on board with “Don’t put all your egg baskets in one egg truck?”

So what is your point, you ask?  Well I do have one, and it is about diversification as it relates to trust deed investing.  Most investors—dare I say—view trust deed investing as a single egg truck, and put many of their egg baskets (but certainly not all) in their “trust deed” egg truck.  And this is where we need to get really specific about this whole issue of egg security.  Almost all the investors I have worked with over the years have been quite certain that they didn’t want to put all of their trust deed money into one single trust deed investment.  That is practically a given.  Typically, an investor with say, one million to invest in trust deeds will look to put that into somewhere in the range of 5-10 separate trust deed investments.  So we are all agreed that a dedicated “trust deed” egg truck is needed.

However, I would go a step further and suggest that if you are seriously involved in trust deed investing, you may want to deploy a small fleet of egg trucks just for trust deed investing.  And how does one do this?  Well, I used to think that this could be accomplished nicely by putting some into subdivision projects, some into home construction projects, and some in standing homes and commercial buildings.  But now I’m not so sure: when the real estate market for residential property tanked, residential subdivisions, residential construction, and finished homes all began to merge into one big thing.  Yes, they were all at different stages of the production process, but ultimately they all became one thing: residential homes.  And those homes all had to be sold or refinanced ultimately at the level of the individual homes.  (The residential river flows in one direction, and always comes to the same point where the river meets the sea.)  And in retrospect, commercial vs. residential didn’t provide as much real diversification as I would have hoped.  Though residential property was the first to fall, commercial seems to have more or less followed along (lemming-like) on its heels, and really not so far behind.  So: perhaps this type of versification was more like putting different types of egg baskets in the same “trust deed” egg truck (as opposed to deploying multiple “trust deed” egg trucks).

I would suggest that perhaps the best way to obtain effective diversification in trust deed investments is to invest in multiple geographic locals.  And in particular, I am thinking on a state by state basis.  For many investors, this goes against their fundamental instincts because they feel safer investing close to home, where they know something about values and where they can deal more effectively (they feel) with the property if they have to take it back.  Those are valid issues and such instincts should not be ignored, but it is important to weigh against them the fact that the massive depreciation in home prices which continues to occur nationwide, happened at widely varying times and to vastly different magnitudes in varying states across this nation.

So not to pick on anyone in particular, but If you think about it: when sub-prime hit the fan in 2007, if your only “trust deed” egg truck was a sixteen wheeler with “SoCal” printed in large letters on the sides, you and your egg baskets were in for a long, rough, treacherous ride down the mountain-side.

– Clay (clay@privatemoneysource.com)